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Introduction
The avalanche of credit card solicitations to U.S. households has concided in a huge increase of credit 
card debt. The degree to which this increase in debt is a problem or a sign of a vibrant economy is hotly 
debated. But clearly credit card debt is a driver of overall debt and is partly a result of the highly 
expensive and opaque terms and conditions applied to credit card borrowing. Some issuers’1 policies –
such as increasing rates and credit limits to those already deep in debt – make it likely that those 
borrowers will find it hard to escape an accelerating spiral of debt. Even those households with high credit 
card balances that eventually get out of debt will pay a high price. In today’s industry, a handful of the 
most sophisticated credit card issuers now perform complex analyses on vast data sets that reveal the 
detailed patterns of their customers’ financial behavior; the issuers then fine-tune their products to
maximize income based on these models. While consumers are ultimately responsible for what they buy, 
the way in which financial institutions construct and describe credit card terms makes it increasingly 
difficult for consumers to understand the products they use. 
The debate about the overall indebtedness of families in the U.S. is partly a result of the legitimately 
different ways in which debt can be measured. A figure of gross indebtedness is not very useful in itself 
partly because some debt, for example a reasonable amount of home mortgage debt or debt resulting from 
college tuition, should also be seen as an investment in the future. Moreover, the seriousness of debt is 
partly a function of how large it is measured against assets and income. The measurement of U.S. savings 
rates has similar complications. The government measure of savings does not, for example, include the 
appreciation of existing savings’ assets. This said, there are reasons for serious concern about debt levels. 
Personal bankruptcies nearly doubled between 1990 and 2002.2 A large number of people are borrowing 
heavily against their homes, so that while the total value of single family homes has risen quite 
dramatically in recent years, the amount of equity people have in their homes has risen by a much more 
modest amount. Equity as a percent of the value of homes fell to a post-World War II low in 2004; 
whereas in 1950 homeowners in aggregate owned 80 percent of the total value of their homes, today 
homeowners own only 55 percent of the total value.3 Further the ratio of debt to assets is a ratio that can 
change dramatically if the assets, particularly house values and the stock market, decline significantly. 
Credit cards also can be used to pay off other debt that would otherwise have forced repayment or 
bankruptcy, thus stringing out repayment until the debt bubble gets even larger.  
While the magnitude of U.S. households’ debt has been well-documented, the reasons why U.S. families 
are so deeply in debt are less clear. The data suggest that rising debt is likely due to a combination of 
factors, among them: a long-term stagnation in real wages, despite the strong economy of the 1990s;4 a 
large increase in debt related to the rising costs of medical expenses, especially for people without 
medical insurance; and a powerful culture of consumption. However, this report examines the credit card 
industry itself as one of the reasons for high debt. Credit card issuers have set up an intricate trap of 
1In credit card lexicon, “issuer” is the term for the depository institution (bank, thrift, or credit union) that issues and funds the credit card. It 
sets the rate, terms, and conditions independently from the brand. A few of the issuers, such as Capital One and MBNA, are “special purpose” 
banks and have no other business outside of credit cards. “Brand” or “network” is the term for the association to which the issuer belongs, i.e., 
either Visa or MasterCard. The brand owns the infrastructure that makes the transaction, while the issuer pays for the goods purchased. In 
addition to firms offering cards through the two major networks, two large nonbank firms, American Express Co. and Discover Financial 
Services (a unit of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and Co.), issue independent cards to the public.
2Alex Baker, “Life and Debt: Why American Families are Borrowing to the Hilt.” Century Foundation, 2004.
3Paul Kasriel, “Begging the Chairman’s Pardon – Household Balance Sheets are Improving?” Northern Trust Corporation: Positive 
Economic Commentary, 17 July, 2003. Found online at http://www.northerntrust.com/library/econ_research/weekly/us/030717.html. 
4According to income distribution charts assembled by United for a Fair Economy. Found online at http://www.faireconomy.org/
research/income_charts.html, last accessed 11 April, 2005.
penalties and fees, all coded in small print with complex legal language, which makes it very easy for 
households to get mired in debt. 
If the U.S. credit card industry were homogenous it would be more difficult to find a standard against 
which to measure the fairness of the product. But the industry is bifurcated in a way that allows a 
comparison of costs, terms, and conditions. Large banks and large credit unions both issue credit cards 
thus allowing a within credit card industry comparison. This report examines the basic issues surrounding 
credit card products and includes a comparison of the terms and conditions of credit cards offered by 
banks and credit cards offered by credit unions. This comparison should start with a brief description of 
the basic differences in purpose and relevant structures between these two kinds of financial institutions.  
Credit unions are not-for-profit cooperatives that distribute any surplus not reinvested in the institution as 
dividends to members. In addition to their cooperative mission, they also have by tradition and federal 
intent a mission to serve “people of small means”. As prior Woodstock Institute’s research shows, there is 
evidence that credit unions do not fulfill that latter mission very successfully.5 But credit unions by 
definition are not profit maximizers; they encourage savings (indeed the basic credit union account, a 
share account is a savings account); and they have a tradition of providing formal and informal financial 
advice to their members. This mission is one reason why credit union issued credit cards might have 
different terms than cards issued by other financial institutions. Another is that credit unions have 
different cost structures than banks. Because they are nonprofit cooperatives and because they have a 
mission of serving lower-income people, they are exempt from most federal and state taxes. However, 
they cannot raise funds from the open market and have to build equity from retained earnings. Credit 
unions are also restricted, compared to banks, in the products they can offer and the lines of business they 
can enter.  
Banks, on the other hand, are driven by the need for a certain level of returns on assets and equity. They 
may also justify high interest rates and fees as the appropriate cost of extending credit to high-risk 
customers. On that point, the evidence suggests that whatever their risks, their profits are very high. In 
2004, the average return on assets6 at credit card issuers was 4.5 percent – the highest level since 1988.7
Credit card lending is one of the most profitable sectors in the financial services industry, and many credit 
card banks have profits higher than such profitable companies as Microsoft and Wal-Mart.8 Banks also 
have a different regulatory structure than credit unions although both types of institutions are subject to 
stringent safety and soundness reviews. They are also both subject to the provisions of the Patriot Act 
which imposes very heavy paper work burdens. Credit unions, unlike banks, are not subject to the 
Community Reinvestment Act. 
This report is organized in the following way. First, it briefly reviews the growth of the credit card 
industry, and the rise of personal debt in the United States. Second, it will report data from a survey of 
credit cards offered by three groups of financial institutions: the ten largest U.S.-based bank and thrift 
companies, ranked by the total amount of credit card loans; the ten largest U.S.-based credit unions, 
5Woodstock’s report found that credit unions in the six-county Chicago region serve much lower percentages of lower-income households 
than they do middle- and upper-income households. Complete results can be found in Katy Jacob, Malcolm Bush, and Dan Immergluck, 
“Rhetoric and Reality: An Analysis of Mainstream Credit Unions’ Record of Serving Low-Income People.” Chicago: Woodstock Institute, 
February 2005.
6Return on assets (or ROA) is a measure of business performance that shows a firm’s profit per dollar of assets; it is derived from dividing 
net income by average total assets; thus, the higher the ROA, the more profitable the business. Regardless of size, a bank with a ROA of 1 percent 
or better is typically considered to be performing well. 
7Lavonne Kuykendall, “Card Lenders Earned More Despite Weak Portfolio Growth,” American Banker, 3 January, 2005.
8See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/interviews/yingling.html. Last accessed 15 April, 2005.
ranked by the total amount of credit card loans; and the largest federally-chartered credit unions in the 
Chicago metropolitan area. Third, the paper will compare the basic features of these three groups of credit 
cards, including the purchase rate, introductory rate, default rate, fees, terms and conditions, cash 
advances, and balance transfers. The report concludes with recommendations for improving credit card 
products to make them fairer for the average consumer. 
This report and its recommendations are especially timely because the Federal Reserve Board is currently 
considering financial sector and consumer responses to a proposal to amend the regulations that govern 
credit cards under the federal Truth in Lending statute.9
The Rise of Credit Cards in the U.S.
The credit card industry rose to prominence in the late 1960s through aggressive mass mail campaigns. 
Before then, consumer credit was extended by banks primarily through installment loans for large durable 
goods, such as the family automobile, furniture, and large appliances. “Open-ended” credit was rare. 
Otherwise, consumers could obtain credit only through “open book” accounts or “tabs” with local 
businesses, usually guaranteed by a personal relationship between the business owner and the consumer. 
In the late 1950s, banks began to explore alternatives to these small consumer loans, which had high 
overhead costs and labor-intensive underwriting. Enter the credit card: an instant line of open-ended 
credit. Bank of America launched the BankAmericard, the first universal credit card, in 1958; imitators 
were quick to follow. By 1970, the United States was blanketed by two large merchant networks, the 
predecessors to Visa and MasterCard.10
Until the late 1970s, credit cards remained widely unprofitable for a simple reason: state usury laws set 
interest rates that were lower than the rate of inflation. Banks offered credit cards primarily as a vehicle to 
cross-sell other products. However, a wave of federal deregulation allowed credit cards to flourish starting 
in the late 1970s. First, the 1978 Supreme Court ruling Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First 
National Bank of Omaha allowed cardholder agreements to be governed by the laws of the bank’s home 
state, rather than the state in which the consumer was located.11 This ruling allowed banks to export 
higher rates from their home state to consumers in other states. Eager to circumvent the state of New 
York’s usury cap of 12 percent, Citibank was the first major bank to relocate in order to export high credit 
card rates to its customers. By 1980, Citibank had moved its credit card processing facility to Sioux Falls, 
South Dakota; in order to attract the 3,000 white-collar jobs that Citibank would bring, the state
legislature eliminated its usury cap altogether. Today, Citibank still has its charter in Sioux Falls for credit 
card lending purposes. Other states soon eliminated usury laws, and now the country’s largest credit card 
issuers have moved to locations in Delaware and South Dakota. The Marquette decision essentially 
allowed banks to nationalize their processing systems and integrate them into the existing Visa and 
9On December 3, 2004 Federal Reserve Board issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) on a review of the credit rules of 
Regulation Z, which implements the Truth in Lending Act. Specifically, the Board asked the industry and consumer advocates to comment on the 
format and content of credit card disclosures, substantive protections, and other issues. 
10For a comprehensive history of the credit card, see: Robert D. Manning, “Credit Card Nation: The Consequences of America’s Addiction 
to Credit.” Basic Books, 2000.
11Marquette National Bank v. First National Bank of Omaha, 439 US 299 (1978).
MasterCard systems.12 It should be noted that the United States is the only country in the world that has 
no cap on interest rates for consumer loans.13
The credit card industry was further deregulated in the 1996 Supreme Court decision Smiley v. Citibank.14
Prior to this decision, late fees and other fees were subject to caps in the state in which the cardholder was 
located, regardless of where the bank was chartered subject to some federal oversight. However, the 
Smiley decision allowed banks to charge the maximum late fee in the state where the credit card issuer
was located.15 This set off a race among banks to maximize late fees and over-the-limit borrowing fees. 
From 1996 to 2002, the average late fee in the industry increased from $13 to $29; overall revenue from 
late fees rose from $1.7 billion to $7.3 billion during that same period.16 In addition, the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999 (also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act)17 allowed banks, 
insurance companies, and investment banking firms to merge and acquire each other for the first time 
since the Great Depression. The result has been a flurry of consolidation in the industry. As banks rapidly 
merged, so did credit card issuers. Today, it is estimated that the top ten credit card issuers account for 91 
percent of outstanding credit card debt, and the top five account for around 64 percent of the market.18
But most important, as a result of the Marquette decision, the Smiley decision, and the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, today’s credit card lending occurs in a comparatively deregulated environment. 
Today’s Credit Card Borrowing
Credit card use exploded due to a highly successful marketing strategy: mass, unsolicited mail campaigns. 
For over two decades, banks have extended credit effectively to anyone with an address, regardless of 
their income and credit score. Children, persons with fixed or no income, and convicted felons all 
regularly receive offers for bank lines of credit. In 2001, 5 billion credit card solicitations were mailed,19
offering low introductory rates and “preapproved” lines of credit. Between 1993 and 2000, the industry 
more than tripled the amount of credit it offered to consumers, from $777 billion to almost $3 trillion. As 
a result, the average U.S. family has $21,000 in available credit.20 Along with the number of solicitations, 
banks have increased credit lines and have decreased minimum monthly payments, with the consequence 
that more principal and interest is revolved and charged during each billing cycle. Further, banks now 
have so much data on their consumers’ behavior that they can calculate how much additional income they 
will receive by changing terms such as lowering minimum monthly payments or increasing the amounts 
of fees.  
12For a complete history of the Citibank move to South Dakota, see: Robin Stein, “The Ascendancy of the Credit Card Industry,” Frontline: 
Secret History of the Credit Card. Found online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/more/rise.html. Last accessed 24 
November, 2004.
13See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/interviews/yingling.html. Last accessed 15 April, 2005.
14Smiley v Citibank (South Dakota), 517 US 733 (1996).
15Robin Stein, “The Ascendancy of the Credit Card Industry,” Frontline: Secret History of the Credit Card. Found online at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/more/rise.html. Last accessed 24 November, 2004.
16Tamara Draut and Javier Silva, “Borrowing to Make Ends Meet: The Growth of Credit Card Debt in the ‘90s,” Demos, September, 2003.
17Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Public Law 106-102, 1999.
18See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/interviews/yingling.html. Last accessed 15 April, 2005. 
19Bernie Sanders, “Modern-day loan sharks disguised in plastic.” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 3 December, 2004.
20Tamara Draut and Javier Silva, “Borrowing to Make Ends Meet: The Growth of Credit Card Debt in the ‘90s.” Demos USA, September, 
2003.
“Cardholder agreements,” the contract meant to give both the bank and the consumer equal standing in 
the relationship, have increasingly become biased towards the credit card issuers. Nowadays, banks can 
unilaterally change the terms of these documents and do so, often, up to 2-3 times per year. In 
consequence, these contracts can, in an ordinary language sense, hardly be termed “agreements” and 
should more accurately be called terms of use. Furthermore, issuers routinely include a mandatory 
arbitration clause into the agreement, under which the consumer gives up his/her right to participate in 
class action lawsuits, as well as private right of action against the issuer. The private right of action is a 
critical legal protection that affords individuals or their representatives the option of seeking enforcement 
of federal regulations through the court system.
Recently, credit card issuers have extended their marketing to target nonprime groups, including the
economically disadvantaged and young people with poorly established credit. College students have 
become particularly attractive to banks: credit card representatives are present in large numbers on 
campuses each fall, soliciting unestablished borrowers with offers of free t-shirts and other gifts. Coupled 
with rising tuition rates, the result is a generation of young people burdened with consumer debt even 
before entering the job market. 
The other side of this picture of increasing consumer debt is that the rise of credit cards has greatly 
improved access to credit. For the first time, all U.S. households can quickly and conveniently access 
loans for consumer goods. This is consistent with Congress’s intent in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(ECOA), which prohibits creditors from discriminating against credit applications on the basis of race, 
color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or because the applicant receives income from a 
public assistance program.21 Credit cards also provide a convenient way to pay for goods without carrying 
cash: the industry estimates that 40 percent of its customers pay off their balances every month, and 
effectively use credit cards as a free payment service rather than a debt instrument. Further, these 
convenience users take advantage of perks such as rewards programs and insurance deals. On the other 
hand, the way in which banks extended this credit is very dangerous. Today’s credit card industry is 
characterized by a bifurcated system under which the services used by “free riders,” the industry’s term 
for users who pay off their balances every month, are subsidized by “revolvers,” or those who carry a 
balance from month to month. This means that the financial services of the wealthy households of the 
U.S. are indirectly subsidized by users who are less fortunate.
Credit unions started to offer card cards in the mid-1980s as a way of competing with banks. However, 
unlike banks, which extend lines of credit regardless of creditworthiness, credit unions typically have 
adopted more stringent lending policies based on a consumer’s income, credit score, and other indicators. 
As a result, most credit unions’ credit card portfolios have remained small. Furthermore, credit unions 
benefit from lower marketing costs, as their market is clearly confined to their field of membership, the 
group of people defined by employer group or community group to which they can offer membership.22
Whereas banks currently spend money and effort on identity theft protection, credit unions are more 
likely to have less sophisticated technology and therefore less concerns about identity theft.
21The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 US C. 1691 et seq.
22Robert D. Manning, personal correspondence with the author. 7 January, 2005.
Survey of Credit Card Terms and Conditions
The survey compared the products of three groups. The first group, listed in Table 1, is banks: it consists 
of the primary depository institutions of the ten largest U.S.-based bank and thrift holding companies, 
ranked by total amount of credit card loans.23 Hereinafter, the term “bank” will be used to refer to 
institutions in this group. The second group, listed in Table 2, is made up of the ten largest credit unions 
nationwide, ranked by total amount of credit card loans.24 Finally, the third group, listed in Table 3, is 
made up of the ten largest federally-chartered credit unions based in the Chicago MSA, ranked by total 
asset size.25 This group is included to give a regional perspective with a group of regional lenders. All the 
data collected in the survey can be found in the Appendix.
The analysis includes what appeared to be the most basic or most standard credit card offered by each 
financial institution. Secured credit cards were not considered in the analysis, nor were rewards programs. 
In addition, many financial institutions have abandoned the convention of offering three levels of cards 
based on creditworthiness, namely Standard/Classic, Gold, and Platinum cards. The cards were 
considered regardless of brand (e.g., Visa or MasterCard). The data in the analysis were collected from 
issuers’ website and through phone calls between December 6th and December 22nd, 2004.
Table 1
Largest U.S.-Based Bank and Thrift Companies, Ranked by Total Amount of 
Credit Card Loans
(As of March 31, 2004 Dollars in thousands)
Institution
Total Credit Card 
Loan Balances, all 
Credit Cards Card Surveyed
1 CitiGroup Inc. $78,451,000 Citi Platinum Select MasterCard
2 Bank Of America Corp. $35,173,798 Visa Gold
3 MBNA Corp. $18,240,715 NFL Extra Points
4 JPMorgan Chase & Co. $15,975,000 Chase Platinum MasterCard
5 Bank One Corp. $10,923,000 Platinum Visa Card
6 Wells Fargo & Co. $8,401,000 Visa Platinum Card
7 US Bancorp $5,815,000 Visa Classic
8 Capital One Financial Corp. $3,563,546 Platinum MasterCard
9 National City Corp. $962,914 Elite Visa
10 BB&T Corp. $809,638 Platinum MasterCard
23As published in the American Banker, 18 August, 2004. Data are accurate as of 31 March, 2004. From this list, USAA Bancorp was 
eliminated due to restraints on information, and FleetBoston Financial Corp. was eliminated due to the merging of its credit card products with 
Bank of America Corp. 
24As published in the American Banker, 6 April, 2005. Data are accurate as of 31 December, 2004.
25As determined through the 2004 Directory of Federally Insured Credit Unions, published by the National Credit Union Administration. 
Data for total amount of credit card loans for this group were not available.
Table 2
 Largest Credit Unions Nationwide, Ranked by Total Amount of Credit Card Loans
(As of December 31, 2004; Dollars in thousands)
Institution
Total Credit Card 
Loan Balances, all 
Credit Cards Card Surveyed
1 Navy FCU $1,775,298 Visa Classic
2 Pentagon FCU $590,053 Visa Classic
3 Suncoast Schools FCU $294,075 Visa Classic
4 Boeing Employees CU $270,765 Visa
5 Pennsylvania State Employees CU $231,930 Visa Capitol Card
6 Digital FCU $215,546 Visa Classic
7 Orange Co. Teachers FCU $200,702 Visa Classic
8 Vystar FCU $192,055 Visa Classic
9 America First CU $161,153 Visa Classic (Option B)
10 Golden 1 CU $158,660 Visa Classic
Table 3
Largest Federally-Chartered Credit Unions Based in the Chicago MSA, 
Ranked by Total Asset Size
(As of January 1, 2004)
Institution Card Surveyed
1 Alliant CU Regular MasterCard
2 Selfreliance Ukrainian American FCU Visa Credit Card
3 Baxter CU Classic Visa
4 Corporate America Family CU Advantage Visa
5 Motorola Employees CU Visa Classic
6 Great Lakes CU Visa Classic
7 First Northern CU Visa Classic
8 DuPage CU Visa Plus
9 Chicago Patrolmen's FCU Visa Classic
10 Illiana Financial CU MasterCard Regular
Credit Card Data Analysis 
The analysis is categorized into several sections based on the key terms that govern credit card 
agreements: purchase rate, introductory rate, default rate, fees, terms and conditions, cash advances, and 
balance transfers.  
Purchase Rate
In today’s credit card market, a single credit card may have several annual percentage rates (APRs), each 
for a different purpose. For example, a card may have one rate for purchases, a second rate for cash 
advances, a third for balance transfers, and a fourth “default” or “penalty” rate. Thus, a monthly statement 
for such a card may have three different sections, with a balance and a rate for each. To add to this 
confusion, a credit card issuer may offer very low introductory or promotional rates, but that rate may 
apply to only one of the several types of transactions. The use of multiple rates and teaser rates makes 
cost-shopping among credit cards increasingly difficult. The following sections review each of these rates 
in further detail; this section deals with the purchase rate, or general rate, of the credit card. 
As Table 4 shows, all ten banks in the survey advertise a range of possible purchase rates for each card, 
rather than one specific rate; this practice means the consumer is “buying” the card without knowing its 
true cost. Upon receipt of the application, the bank will determine the card’s rate based on the consumer’s 
creditworthiness and subsequently offer a contract based on it. The consumer is not told the method for 
which his/her creditworthiness is determined. In contrast, credit unions were much less likely to conceal 
the initial purchase rate by advertising that the purchase rate would be fixed post-application within a 
range. Ranges were advertised by five national credit unions and only one Chicago region credit union. 
Instead of advertising a range, credit unions were more likely to have three levels of creditworthiness--
Standard/Classic, Gold, or Platinum--each with a specific corresponding rate. But while the relationship 
between creditworthiness and pricing was fixed for a number of the credit unions, consumers would still 
only know after they receive the card in which creditworthy category they would be placed. It is clearly 
not possible to shop for a price if the price is concealed in this manner.  
Table 4
Purchase Rates of Credit Cards in Survey
* “Lowest” or “Highest” rate refers to the lowest or highest rate advertised, regardless of whether this value was 
part of a range.
** Where ranges were used, the midpoint of the range was used in determining “average rate.” In two cases, no 
upper bound was given for a range (e.g., “Rates as low as 9.9 percent APR”). When this occurred, these cases 
were eliminated from determination of the average rate.
The purchase rate, like any rate, may be either fixed or variable. The best scenario is for a consumer to 
obtain a fixed rate when the prime rate is low, thus “locking in” a low rate. Variable rates, on the other 
hand, typically fluctuate each billing cycle. Most banks will assign a margin to a consumer based on 
credit risk; for each billing cycle, the consumer’s rate will be the prime rate plus that margin. Consumers 
who are riskier borrowers have high margins and thus higher rates, while more creditworthy consumers 
have lower margins and thus lower rates. The difference between banks and credit unions on the use of 
fixed or variable interest rates for the basic credit card is dramatic. As Table 4 shows, nine of the banks 
use a variable rate scheme, while only one national credit union and one Chicago region credit union use 
variable rates.
It is difficult to compare interest rates when some issuers use fixed and other variable rates, but as Table 4 
also shows credit unions offer both lower minimum and lower maximum rates. Banks appear to offer a 
slightly lower average rate but that figure is not interpretable without information about how individual 
customer rates cluster around that average. Members of federal credit unions can also be assured that their 
rates will only increase above 18 percent as part of a deliberate decision by these credit unions’ regulator, 
No. of 
Institutions 
with Ranges
Lowest 
Rate* 
Highest 
Rate*
Average 
Rate**
No. of Institutions 
with Variable 
Rates
Banks 8 of 10 8.9 20.25 12.11 9 of 10
National CUs 5 of 10 6.9 17 12.29 1 of 10
Chicago Region CUs 1 of 10 9.75 16.88 13.24 1 of 10
the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). The NCUA implements a maximum loan rate for the 
credit unions that it supervises and adjusts that rate according to market conditions.26 State supervised 
credit unions are subject to state regulation, a few of which include rate caps.  It should be noted that four 
of the ten credit unions labeled “national credit unions” in this report are, in fact, state chartered, and are, 
therefore, not subject to the NCUA cap.  
Introductory Rate
Introductory rates or “teaser rates” are promotional offers that keep one or all of the credit card’s rates 
low, often at 0 percent, for a specified number of billing cycles. Many times, credit card solicitations 
entice customers to transfer a balance from another card with a new, 0 percent rate card. 
While introductory rates may allow consumers to pay off debt during the introductory period, these offers 
are misleading in a number of ways. An advisory letter from the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) to national banks in September 200427 warned that issuers often do a poor job of 
describing the limitations of introductory rates. For example, the promotion often applies only to the 
balance transfer rate and not to the purchase rate during the promotional period. In addition, the 
consumer’s benefits from the introductory period may be offset by the imposition of fees on the balance 
transfers, which often are poorly disclosed. Furthermore, solicitations also fail to clearly advise that the 
introductory rate may terminate upon a late payment, over limit charge, or other penalty; at that time, the 
rate may increase to the default rate (discussed below). The effect of these complexities is deception. This 
is bad enough for a consumer who applies for a credit card with a 0 percent introductory rate in order to 
consolidate and reduce debt; consumers who continue to rack up new credit card debt on the new card 
may soon find themselves with a heavy additional debt burden if they trigger a penalty rate change.  
Table 5
Introductory Rates of Credit Cards in Survey
The survey illustrated how banks are much more aggressive than credit unions in offering introductory 
rates to attract initial customers, as shown in table 5. Eight of ten banks offered an introductory rate of 0 
percent; of these seven, five offers lasted for six billing periods, while the remaining three lasted for 12
billing periods. Typically, these rates will increase to the default rate as soon as a customer makes a late 
payment, exceeds the credit limit, or if the payment check bounces. None of the national credit unions 
offered an introductory rate, while only one Chicago region credit union offered a modest 5.90 percent 
rate for the first six billing cycles.
26The NCUA Board meets regularly to adjust the interest rate cap; the adjustments are based on the current market conditions. The 18 
percent presented above is current as of 26 January, 2005, per a final rule that would amend 12 CFR Part 701. The final rule can be found online 
at http://www.ncua.gov/RegulationsOpinionsLaws/RecentFinalRegs/F-701.pdf. 
27The September 2004 OCC advisory letter can be found online at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2004-10.doc. Last accessed 4 
January, 2004.
No. With 
Introductory 
Rates
Lowest 
Rate
Highest 
Rate
Average Introductory 
Period, in Billing 
Cycles
Banks 8 of 10 0.00% 8.90% 8.25
National CUs 0 of 10 .. .. ..
Chicago Region  CUs 1 of 10 5.90% 5.90% 6
Default Rate
The default rate, or penalty rate, is a predetermined benchmark to which rates will rise when the 
consumer incurs a penalty. While the specifics of the default rate vary by institution, it may be triggered 
by a late payment, a bounced payment check, or when the customer exceeds the credit limit. By law, it 
must be included in credit card solicitations and within the cardholder agreement. The default rate may 
also be variable. Given that default rates are often double and even triple the purchase rate, they are major 
contributors to the growth of consumer debt.  
In today’s credit card lending environment, a consumer can be in default in two ways. First is “in-card” 
default; that is, the default rate takes effect when a consumer makes a late payment or is over the credit 
limit on that card. This can take effect even on the first late payment. Second, many credit card issuers
have begun using the controversial practice of “universal default,” a misleading scheme that has become 
increasingly common over the last few years. This process starts when a credit card issuer reviews all its 
customers’ credit reports through an arrangement with a credit bureau. If the bank finds a consumer is late 
or delinquent with any creditor or utility provider, it will increase the rate to the default rate.28 For 
example, if a consumer has a perfect record on her American Express card but has been late once on her 
MasterCard, American Express can raise its rate, justifying the increase as protection against a “higher 
credit risk.” While universal default has caught the attention of consumer advocates and the press,29 it 
remains legal as long as the issuer discloses it in the fine print of the cardholder agreement. This practice 
has become widespread. A 2003 survey by Consumer Action of California showed that 39 percent of its 
sample of bank credit cards implemented universal default.30 In September 2004, the OCC issued a 
warning letter to the national banks it regulates regarding this process.31 However, the letter was merely a 
slap on the wrist: the OCC warned national banks that they should not fail to fully and prominently 
disclose in promotional materials the circumstances under which the rate may rise. Universal default can 
be hidden in the fine print in a number of ways. Some banks may explicitly state that it will raise the rate 
when payment is due to another creditor. Other times, banks reserve the right to raise the rate at any time 
for any reason, which includes universal default. Credit cards are the only sector of lending in which 
universal default is used – student loans, auto loans, and home mortgages do not have universal default 
clauses.
A simple example shows just how dangerous today’s default schemes can be. Suppose a consumer has 
three credit card accounts, one each with issuers A, B, and C. She sends a check to issuer A two days 
before the due date, but makes the mistake of having insufficient funds in her checking account. Issuer A 
will likely charge a bad check fee, plus a late fee. Further, issuer A’s “in-card” default rate is now 
triggered, so the rate on this card is now upwards of 25 percent. However, in addition, issuers B and C can 
now raise their rates to this high level also, under the argument that the consumer is now a higher credit 
risk. As a result, the consumer’s credit score plunges. Thus, the consumer is punished severely for writing 
one bad check. It is very difficult to pay one’s way out of debt when one honest mistake can have such a 
disastrous effect. All of this is legal so long as it is disclosed in the fine print of “Cardholder 
Agreements.”
28Lucy Lazarony, “Credit card companies look to raise your rates by spying on your credit.” Bankrate.com, found online at: 
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/cc/19990524.asp. Last accessed 4 January, 2004.
29See, for example: Jennifer Bayot, “Jumps in Rates Bring Scrutiny of Credit Laws,” New York Times, 29 May, 2003; Chuck Jaffe, “Zero 
in on details of card offers,” Chicago Tribune, 2 September, 2003. 
30Linda Sherry et. al., “Credit Card Survey 2004.” Consumer Action News, Spring 2004.
31The September 2004 OCC Advisory letter can be found online at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2004-10.doc. Last accessed 4 
January, 2004.
Table 6 shows that nine out of ten banks in the survey had a default rate compared to only four of ten 
national credit unions and one of ten Chicago region credit unions. At banks, the default rate ranges from 
19.8 percent to an astronomical 28.99 percent, with an average of 25.41 percent. At national credit unions, 
the four that use default rates average 19.80 percent; at Chicago region credit unions, the single credit 
union with a default rate is at 17.99 percent. 
Table 6
Default Rates of Credit Cards in Survey
No. With 
Default 
Rates
Lowest of those 
institutions with 
Default Rates
Highest of those 
institutions with 
Default Rates Average
Banks 9 of 10 19.8% 28.99% 25.4%
National CUs 4 of 10 16.9% 27.9% 19.8%
Chicago Region CUs 1 of 10 17.99% 17.99% 17.99%
Fees, Terms and Conditions
The survey included data on various other fees, terms, and conditions of credit card contracts. In 1995, the 
credit card industry generated $8.3 billion in all fees, and by 2003 this number skyrocketed to $20.7 
billion.32 This is largely due to the aforementioned 1996 Smiley decision that allows issuers to export 
higher fee ceilings from the states in which they are located. The types of fees included in the survey 
include annual fees, late fees, over-the-credit-limit fees, cash advance fees (covered below in its own 
section), and balance transfer fees (also covered in its own section).33
Annual fees have largely been discarded. In the early 1980s, annual fees were assessed to cover the costs 
of unprofitable “free riders”–customers who avoid interest charges by paying their balance every month. 
In an effort to increase the market for credit cards, issuers eliminated annual fees and instead increased 
types and amounts of penalty fees. Typically, annual fees today exist only for high-end cards with 
rewards programs. None of the cards in the survey had annual fees.
Issuers have steadily increased late fees and have introduced a number of misleading schemes to 
maximize the number of late payments. Late fees are the golden goose of credit card issuers. In 1996, the 
industry generated $1.7 billion in late fees; in 2002, it collected $7.3 billion.34 According to another 
survey, nearly 30 percent of credit card consumers had been charged a late fee in 2001.35 At the same 
time, many issuers have squeezed the grace period for repayment from 30 days down to 20 days to 
increase the likelihood of a late payment, as shown in Table 7. Many have also set the payment deadline 
32Demos USA, “Credit Card Industry Practices: In Brief.” Found online at http://www.demos-usa.org/pubs/IndustryPractices_WEB.pdf. 
Last accessed 6 January, 2005.
33In addition to these fees, credit cards may also include set-up fees, credit-limit-increase fees, return-item fees, currency conversion fees, 
and others. For an extensive list of these fees, see “Choosing a Credit Card,” Federal Reserve Board. Found online at 
http:/www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/shop/. Last accessed 6 January, 2005.
34Demos USA, “Credit Card Industry Practices: In Brief.” Found online at http://www.demos-usa.org/pubs/IndustryPractices_WEB.pdf. 
Last accessed 6 January, 2005.
35Thomas A. Durkin, “Consumers and Credit Disclosures: Credit Cards and Credit Insurance.” Federal Reserve Bulletin, April, 2002.
at 1 p.m. on the due date; so, if the letter carrier is a bit late that day, so is the payment.36 A 2004 survey 
by Consumer Action showed that 58 percent of surveyed banks now have a cut-off time in addition to a 
cut-off date.37 Issuers may also periodically switch their payment address among multiple P.O. boxes, so 
that payments are bounced around the card processing center thus causing a further delay.38 A payment 
that is even a minute late may result in a huge rate increase.
As Tables 7 and 8 illustrate, credit unions are more consumer friendly in regards to the grace periods and 
late fees of their products. Banks have made late fees progressively more difficult to understand; eight of 
ten surveyed used a tiered system in assessing late fees. For example, a bank may charge a $15 late fee on 
a balances up to $100; $29 on balances of $100-$1,000; and $39 on balances of $1,000 and over. In 
contrast, no national credit union and no Chicago region credit union used tiered systems, thus 
eliminating confusion. One national credit union, however, charges 5 percent of the past due payment, but 
no less than $10. Due to the use of tiered systems, dollar-to-dollar comparisons among the three groups 
were not made.
Table 7
Grace Periods* of Credit Cards in Survey
Lowest Highest Average
Standard 
Deviation
Banks 20 days 25 days 21.5 days 2.41
National CUs 25 days 25 days 25 days 0.00
Chicago Region CUs 25 days 25 days 25 days 0.00
*Grace period is defined as the number of days between the close of the billing cycle and the date the payment 
is due.
Table 8
Late Fees of Credit Cards in Survey
No. Using Tiered 
Systems Rather 
than a Specific Fee
Lowest Late Fee 
in Group*
Highest Late Fee in 
Group*
Banks 8 of 10 $15 $39
National CUs 0 of 10 $10 $25
Chicago Region CUs 0 of 10 $10 $25
*“Lowest” or “Highest” late fee refers to the lowest or highest value advertised, regardless of whether this 
value was part of a tiered system.
36Amy C.Fleitas, “20 Sneaky Credit Card Tricks.” Bankrate.com, found online at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/cc/20021106a.asp. 
Last accessed 4 January, 2004.
37Linda Sherry et. al., “Credit Card Survey 2004.” Consumer Action News, Spring 2004.
38Amy C. Fleitas, “20 Sneaky Credit Card Tricks.” Found online at http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/cc/20021106a.asp. Last accessed 4 
January, 2004.
Over-the-limit fees seem benign enough—but issuers charge excessive amounts when a consumer 
inadvertently exceeds the limit by as little as $1. Once again, banks charge more than credit unions for 
this fee. In fact, the lowest over-the-limit fee charged by a bank in the sample ($29) was higher than the 
highest fee charged by a national credit union ($27). As shown in Table 9, the banks’ average of $33.60 
far exceeds the national credit unions’ average of $17.90 and credit unions’ average of $23.33. Only one 
institution, a Chicago region credit union, does not have an over-the-limit fee. 
Table 9
Over-the-Limit Fees of Credit Cards in Survey
No. With 
OTL  Fees Lowest Highest Average
Standard 
Deviation
Banks 10 of 10 $29 $39 $33.60 3.41
National CUs 10 of 10 $10 $27 $17.90 5.66
Chicago Region CUs 9 of 10 $10 $35 $23.33 6.61
Cash Advances
A cash advance is the feature of a credit card that allows the consumer to borrow cash on the card’s line 
of credit, rather than purchase goods or services. Unlike regular purchases, however, the interest for cash 
advances usually begins to accrue as soon as the advance is made, rather than at the end of the billing 
cycle. Issuers profit handsomely from high fees assessed on cash advances. But the central issue in cash 
advance features is that many cards have a different rate for cash advance balances. Nine of ten banks in 
the survey implement a different APR for cash advances. This means that a credit card statement will 
show (at least) two sections: one for purchases, which is charged the purchase rate, and a second for cash 
advances, which is charged a special cash advance APR. Usually, cash advances are charged a much 
higher rate – in fact, on average the cash advance rate was higher by a margin of 6.99 percent among 
banks in the survey. The use of multiple rates increases confusion about the full price of cash advances 
for what is a very expensive product. 
Once again, credit unions provide the same service at a much lower price, as shown in Table 10. On 
average, banks charge a fee of 3.2 percent of each cash advance, but not to be lower than an average 
“floor” of $6.50. All ten banks have no upper bound for cash advances. Thus, for a cash advance of 
$1,000, the average bank would charge a fee of $32.00. In comparison, seven of ten national credit unions 
and six of ten Chicago region credit unions do not charge any fees for cash advances whatsoever.39 Of the 
three national credit unions that do have fees, the average fee is 1.93 percent of the advance; at the four 
Chicago region credit unions, this number is 2 percent. As also shown in Table 10, their fee floors are 
much lower. With the exception of one national credit union, all credit unions use the same rate for both 
purchases and cash advances. 
39At one national credit union, there is a nominal fee of 50 cents for a cash advance, regardless of the amount of the advance. Similarly at 
one Chicago credit union there is a $2 fee for cash advances.
Table 10
Cash Advances of Credit Cards in Survey
No. of 
Institutions 
with Cash 
Advance 
Fees*
Of those 
with CA 
Fees, 
Average 
Percent of 
Balance 
Charged as 
Fee
Of those 
with CA 
Fees, 
Average Fee 
not to Be 
Lower Than 
(Fee Floor)
No. of 
Institutions 
where CA 
rate is 
Higher than 
Purchase
APR
Of those Institutions 
with a Higher CA 
Rate, the margin by 
which the Average 
CA Rate is Higher 
than the Purchase
Rate
Banks 10 of 10 3.20% $6.50 9 of 10 6.99%
National 
CUs
3 of 10 1.83% $0.66 1 of 10 3.00%
Chicago 
Region CUs
4 of 10 2.00% $3.50 0 of 10 ..
*At one national credit union, there is a nominal fee of 50 cents for a cash advance, regardless of the amount of the 
advance. Similarly at one Chicago region credit union there is a $2 fee for cash advances. These two cases are not 
included in the above table.
Balance Transfers
Credit card issuers also benefit greatly from the high fees charged for balance transfers, as shown in Table 
11. Typically, a consumer requests a balance transfer when moving a large sum of money from a high-
rate credit card to a lower rate card. In 2001, a survey showed that 27 percent of credit card holders had 
transferred balances in the previous year.40 Some banks even include unsolicited “convenience checks” in 
credit card solicitations to encourage the consumer to make a transfer.41 What the banks fail to indicate
clearly, however, is that balance transfers come at a high cost. Furthermore, like cash advances, balance 
transfers may have a different rate than the purchase rate, once again confusing most consumers. Usually, 
banks intentionally set balance transfers lower than the purchase rate in order to entice new business by 
luring consumers to that card.  
The survey found that while balance transfer APRs were similar across the three groups, banks profit 
from exorbitant balance transfer fees, which are often poorly disclosed. Thus, any advantage that a 
consumer gains through a low balance transfer APR is offset by the implementation of large fees. All 
seven banks that implement balance transfer fees charge a rate of 3 percent of each transfer. All seven set 
a fee floor, which averages $6.43. As also shown in Table 11, two of these banks have no maximum cap 
for a balance transfer fee (the other five cap at an average of $63). For those two banks, therefore, a 
balance transfer of $3,000 would incur a fee of $90. In stark contrast, there are no fees for balance 
transfers at eight of ten national credit unions and zero of the ten Chicago region credit unions. At the two 
national credit unions that do charge for balance transfers, the fee is 2 percent of the advance, with an 
average cap at $30.
40Thomas A. Durkin, “Consumers and Credit Disclosures: Credit Cards and Credit Insurance.” Federal Reserve Bulletin, April, 2002.
41Convenience checks can be used for any type of transaction including balance transfers, cash advances, and even regular purchases. The 
terms and rates depend on the type of transaction.  To add to the confusion, the rates also depend on the order of the convenience check in the set 
of checks the bank sends the customer.  
Table 11
Balance Transfers of Credit Cards in Survey
No. of 
Institution 
With 
Balance 
Transfer 
Fees
Of those 
with BT 
Fees, 
Average 
Percent of 
Advance 
Charged as 
Fee
Of those 
with BT 
Fees, 
Average 
Fee not to 
Be Lower 
Than (Fee 
Floor)
Of those 
with BT 
Fees, 
Average 
Fee not to 
be Higher 
Than (Fee 
Floor)
No. of 
Institutions 
where  BT 
Rate
Different
than 
Purchase
Rate
Banks 7 of 10 3.00% $6.43 $63* 2 of 10
National CUs 2 of 10 2.00% $2.00 $30 3 of 10
Chicago Region CUs 0 of 10 .. .. .. 1 of 10
*At two of the seven banks with balance transfer fees, there is no limit to the maximum amount of fee possible. 
These two were not included in this average.
Recommendations for Public Policy
This analysis shows the vast complexity of the pricing of credit card products. This complexity is most 
likely to have a highly deceptive effect on consumer perceptions of the cost of credit. But the credit union 
data described above demonstrate that credit card lending can be done without exorbitant fees and without 
confusing terms. The ten largest credit unions in the country and the Chicago area’s top ten credit unions 
provide a clear example that credit card lending can be done without misleading and confusing costs, 
terms, and conditions. As we pointed out in the introduction, credit unions have lower-cost structures than 
banks but this difference does not explain the huge differences in fees structures between the two types of 
financial institutions or the huge difference in the complexity of terms.  
While bankers often respond to such criticism by calls for more financial literacy training, the complexity 
of credit card terms and the frequent changes in those terms are likely to confuse all but the most careful 
consumer. Rather, consumers need a simple statement of the costs of doing business with a credit card 
company. Consumer groups see the complexity as part of a larger and deliberate trend by consumer 
service providers such as cable providers, and cellular phone providers to hide the true costs of their 
services. Price-shopping among this group of providers is next to impossible. There is an academic term 
for such practices, “shrouding”, whereby “optimizing firms” exploit “myopic” consumers through 
marketing schemes that “shroud” the true price of the product.42 Another way to express the same idea is 
that credit card companies thwart the workings of the market by concealing the price of their products.  
One unfair consequence of this and other credit card practices is that the 40 percent of credit card holders 
who pay off their balances every month pay nothing for the convenience of credit card use and are 
subsidized by the people who hold balances. In general, the former group are higher-income than the 
latter group and so the less-well off are subsidizing the better-off.  
Vigorous enforcement of existing laws and the banning of practices which have a deceptive effect 
because of their complexity are needed to stop the current abuses. Federal banking regulators currently 
have authority to regulate “unfair and deceptive acts and practices” in credit card solicitations, a power 
42See for example Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson, “Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Supression in Competitive 
Markets, unpublished mss., MIT and Harvard University, April, 2005. 
delegated to them under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).43 But since this power was 
delegated to them in 1975, the federal banking regulators have only used their powers six times to 
investigate deceptive credit card solicitations. The most notable of these was in 2000, when the OCC 
ordered Providian National Bank to refund $300 million for deceptive marketing. However, this case is 
the exception rather than the rule. A major problem with the FTC Act is that the types of infractions the 
OCC and other federal regulators are empowered to investigate are unclear, as are guidelines for 
penalties.44 These issues need prompt attention; in the meantime, the regulatory agencies should use the 
powers at their disposal to curtail current deceptive practices.  
Another line of defense for consumers is clear notice of the charges they will and can incur in credit card 
transactions. The Federal Reserve Board is currently reviewing Regulation Z which implements the Truth 
in Lending Act. We concur with our colleagues at the National Consumer Law Center who are urging the 
Board should use this opportunity to:
 Improve the clarity and effectiveness of disclosures;
 Tighten up the finance charge rules so that the APR is a more accurate gauge of the cost of credit;
 Require the use of a “typical” APR in solicitations, applications and at account opening to give 
consumers information that is more meaningful than just a periodic rate;
 Retain the effective APR in billing statements.45
There is proper skepticism about the utility of highly complex disclosures. But in the case of credit card 
disclosures their complexity is driven by the complexity of the products’ costs structures whose clear 
purpose is to maximize income in a way that conceals the true cost of transactions. So the problem 
requires a two-pronged approach. Clear disclosure remains the essential basis of effective action by and 
on behalf of consumers. The Federal Reserve Board in its current review of Regulation Z should make 
every effort to make the true costs of borrowing clear. But in addition, the Board should urge Congress to 
provide for substantive protections against the abuses of the credit card industry. Again, the following 
regulatory proposals come from the National Consumer Law Center: 
 No unilateral change in terms allowed.
 No penalties for any behavior not directly linked to the specific card account at issue.
 No improvident extensions of credit—real underwriting of the consumer’s ability to pay should be 
required.
43The “unfair and deceptive acts and practices” dictum is administered by a particular bank’s federal regulator. They were delegated this 
power upon a substantial revision to the FTC Act in 1975. Four federal entities regulate banks and thrifts: the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), 
which supervises thrifts and savings-and-loans; the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), which supervises some state-chartered banks; the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which supervises state-chartered banks which are not members of the FRB; and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which supervises banks with national charters. Given that the credit card industry is highly concentrated 
among banks with national charters, it is estimated that the OCC regulates 70 percent of all credit card assets. 
44Todd Davenport, “New Goals, New Methods: Consumer focus has regulators using FTC Act.” American Banker 15 December, 2004; also 
Todd Davenport, “Too Vague for Both Sides: FTC Act enforcement worries banks, activists,” American Banker, 16 December, 2004.
45These recommendations come from our colleagues at the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC). Their comments to the Federal 
Reserve Board’s review of Regulation Z can be found online at http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/test_and_comm/content/open_ 
end_final.pdf. Last accessed 11 April, 2005. 
 No mandatory arbitration, either for consumers’ claims or for collection against consumers.
 Meaningful penalties for violating any substantive or disclosure rules.
 A private right of action to enforce Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits 
unfair or deceptive practices by businesses, including banks.
One very controversial issue is re-imposing interest rate caps. There have been interest rate caps in 
America from colonial times up to the 1980s. Clearly only floating interest rates, a given rate over and 
above a floating base, makes sense in an economy where interest rates can fluctuate widely. But without 
such caps there is apparently no limit to what credit card companies will charge, keeping many lower- and 
middle-income Americans in a vise grip of unrepayable debt. As Elisabeth Warren of Harvard Law 
School points out, in the last 30 years average wages controlling for inflation have only increased 1 
percent. To add 30 percent interest rates on credit card balances in this situation means that the average 
borrower is paying credit card interest out of future wages and will never catch up.46 As we noted earlier, 
part of the industry, federally chartered credit unions, operates under an interest rate ceiling, a restriction 
that has not hampered growth.    
Another important topic that has not received the public attention it deserves is the “stickiness” of credit 
card costs. While these costs move upwards freely, there seems to be no movement down even in this era 
of unusually low-interest rates. This stickiness suggests the possibility of anti-trust violations and this 
possibility should be investigated.
In the meantime, there is a clear difference between credit cards issued by banks and those issued by 
credit unions. The terms and conditions of credit cards issued by the large banks are much more complex 
than those of the large credit union issuers. Those complexities are likely to result in the bank customers 
not understanding the full cost of using the banks’ cards and therefore in incurring much higher fees.
46Interview with Elizabeth Warren reported on the PBS Frontline website at http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/warren/html. Last accessed, 
June 10, 2005. 
Appendix: Data Used in Credit Card Survey
Notes
1. The placekeeper “n/a” is used where no data exists for a particular field. For example, when “n/a” 
appears in the “balance transfer fee” field, that institution has no balance transfer fee.
2. “Cash advance fee” and “balance transfer fee” are represented as a percent of the total amount of the 
advance or transfer. 
3. Institutions’ use of tiered systems makes it especially difficult to measure and compare late fees. 
Thus, the field “Lowest Possible Late Fee” represents the low end of an institution’s range of late 
fees, and “Highest Possible Late Fee” similarly represents the high end of the range.  
4. For many institutions, the purchase APR, cash advance APR, and balance transfer APR are the same. 
However, this number is nevertheless listed in each of these three fields.
5. Grace period is defined as the number of days between the date that the billing cycle ends and the 
date the bill is due.
6. For all other definitions, see the text of this document. 
1 TYPE: BANK INSTITUTION: CITIGROUP
NAME OF CARD: PLATINUM SELECT MASTERCARD
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.24%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 9.24%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: 0.00%
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: 12
DEFAULT RATE: 28.99%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: VARIABLE
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $35
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $15
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $39
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 20
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 19.99%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
CA FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $5
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.24%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 9.24%
BT FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $5
FEE CEILING: $50
2 TYPE: BANK INSTITUTION: BANK OF AMERICA
NAME OF CARD: VISA GOLD  (marketed as the "balance transfer" card)
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 12.99%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 17.99%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: 8.90%
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: 6
DEFAULT RATE: 26.99%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: VARIABLE
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $35
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $19
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $39
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 20
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 19.99%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
CA FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $10
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 8.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 8.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
3 TYPE: BANK INSTITUTION: MBNA
NAME OF CARD: NFL EXTRA POINTS
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 10.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 10.90%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $39
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $15
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $39
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 20.99%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
CA FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $10
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 10.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 10.90%
BT FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $10
FEE CEILING: $75
4 TYPE: BANK INSTITUTION: JP MORGAN CHASE
NAME OF CARD: CHASE PLATINUM MASTERCARD
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 8.99%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 19.99%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: 0.00%
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: 12
DEFAULT RATE: 28.99%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: VARIABLE
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $35
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $15
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $39
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 20
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 20.99%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
CA FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $10
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.99%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 13.99%
BT FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $5
FEE CEILING: $75
5 TYPE: BANK INSTITUTION: BANK ONE
NAME OF CARD: PLATINUM VISA CARD
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.49%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 13.49%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: 0.00%
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: 12
DEFAULT RATE: 25.47%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: VARIABLE
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $35
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $15
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $35
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 20
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 20.49%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
CA FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $10
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.49%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 13.49%
BT FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $5
FEE CEILING: $65
6 TYPE: BANK INSTITUTION: WELLS FARGO
NAME OF CARD: VISA PLATINUM CARD
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 7.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 20.25%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: 0.00%
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: 6
DEFAULT RATE: 23.90%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: VARIABLE
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $35
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $20
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $35
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 20
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 20.24%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
CA FEE: 4%
FEE FLOOR: $5
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 7.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 20.25%
BT FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $5
FEE CEILING: $50
7 TYPE: BANK INSTITUTION: US BANK
NAME OF CARD: VISA CLASSIC
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 10.99%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 19.99%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: 0.00%
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: 6
DEFAULT RATE: 23.99%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: FIXED
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $35
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $35
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $35
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 20
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 19.99%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
CA FEE: 4%
FEE FLOOR: $5
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 10.99%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 19.99%
BT FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $5
FEE CEILING: n/a
8 TYPE: BANK INSTITUTION: CAPITAL ONE
NAME OF CARD: PLATINUM MASTERCARD
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 8.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 8.90%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: 19.80%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: FIXED
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $29
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $29
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $35
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 19.80%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
CA FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $5
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 8.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 8.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
9 TYPE: BANK INSTITUTION: NATIONAL CITY
NAME OF CARD: ELITE VISA
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: 0.00%
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: 6
DEFAULT RATE: 23.90%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: FIXED
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $29
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $15
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $35
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 20
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 10.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $0
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
BT FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $10
FEE CEILING: n/a
10 TYPE: BANK INSTITUTION: BB&T
NAME OF CARD: VISA PLATINUM MASTERCARD
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 8.65%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 11.65%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: 0.00%
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: 6
DEFAULT RATE: 26.65%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: FIXED
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $29
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $35
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $35
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 17.65%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
CA FEE: 3%
FEE FLOOR: $5
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 8.65%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 11.65%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
11 TYPE: NATIONAL CU INSTITUTION: NAVY FCU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CLASSIC
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $10
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: n/a
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: n/a
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 11.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: $0.50
FEE CEILING: $1
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
12 TYPE: NATIONAL CU INSTITUTION: PENTAGON FCU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CLASSIC
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 12.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 12.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $15
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 12.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: 0%
FEE FLOOR: $0
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 5.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 5.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
13 TYPE: NATIONAL CU INSTITUTION: SUNCOAST SCHOOLS FCU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CLASSIC
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 12.50%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 12.50%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $15
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $10
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $10
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 12.50%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 12.50%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 12.50%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
14 TYPE: NATIONAL CU INSTITUTION: BOEING EMPLOYEES CU
NAME OF CARD: VISA
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 6.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 16.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: 27.90%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: FIXED
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $25
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 11.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: 2%
FEE FLOOR: $0
FEE CEILING: $10
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
BT FEE: 2%
FEE FLOOR: $0
FEE CEILING: $10
15 TYPE: NATIONAL CU INSTITUTION: PENNSYLVANIA STATE EMPLOYEES CU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CAPITOL CARD
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 9.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $20
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $20
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $20
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 12.9%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 3.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 3.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
16 TYPE: NATIONAL CU INSTITUTION: DIGITAL FCU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CLASSIC
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: n/a
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: 16.90%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: FIXED
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $20
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $20
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $20
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 9.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 9.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
17 TYPE: NATIONAL CU INSTITUTION: ORANGE COUNTY TEACHERS FCU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CLASSIC
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 13.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: 16.9%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: FIXED
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $20
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $20
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $20
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 11.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 13.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
18 TYPE: NATIONAL CU INSTITUTION: VYSTAR FCU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CLASSIC
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 12.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 12.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a%
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $27
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 12.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 12.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 12.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
19 TYPE: NATIONAL CU INSTITUTION: AMERICA FIRST CU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CLASSIC [OPTION B]
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.75%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: n/a
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $17
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $10
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: n/a
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 9.75%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: 1.5%
FEE FLOOR: $0
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.75%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: n/a
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
20 TYPE: NATIONAL CU INSTITUTION: GOLDEN 1 CU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CLASSIC
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 17.00%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: 17.50%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: FIXED
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $10
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $15
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $15
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 13.45%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: 2%
FEE FLOOR: $2
FEE CEILING: $50
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 10.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 16.00%
BT FEE: 2%
FEE FLOOR: $2
FEE CEILING: $50
21 TYPE: CHICAGO REGION CU INSTITUTION: ALLIANT CU
NAME OF CARD: REGULAR MASTERCARD
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 9.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $0
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $10
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $10
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 9.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: 0%
FEE FLOOR: $2
FEE CEILING: $2
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 9.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
22 TYPE: CHICAGO REGION CU INSTITUTION: SELFRELIANCE UKRANIAN AMERICAN 
FCU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CREDIT CARD
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $25
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 11.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
23 TYPE: CHICAGO REGION CU INSTITUTION: BAXTER CU
NAME OF CARD: CLASSIC VISA
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.75%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 9.75%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $25
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 9.75%
APR TYPE: VARIABLE
CA FEE: 2%
FEE FLOOR: $2
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 9.75%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 9.75%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
24 TYPE: CHICAGO REGION CU INSTITUTION: CORPORATE AMERICA FAMILY CU
NAME OF CARD: ADVANTAGE VISA
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 19.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $35
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $35
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $35
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 15.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 19.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
25 TYPE: CHICAGO REGION CU INSTITUTION: MOTOROLA EMPLOYEES CU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CLASSIC
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 14.88%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 14.88%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: 5.90%
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: 6
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $20
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $20
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $20
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 14.88%
APR TYPE: n/a
CA FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 14.88%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 14.88%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
26 TYPE: CHICAGO REGION CU INSTITUTION: GREAT LAKES CU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CLASSIC
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 14.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 14.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $25
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 14.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: 2%
FEE FLOOR: $2
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 14.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 14.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
27 TYPE: CHICAGO REGION CU INSTITUTION: FIRST NORTHERN CU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CLASSIC
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 13.50%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 13.50%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: 17.99%
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: FIXED
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $20
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $20
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $20
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 13.5%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: 2%
FEE FLOOR: $5
FEE CEILING: $5
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 5.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 5.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
28 TYPE: CHICAGO REGION CU INSTITUTION: DUPAGE CU
NAME OF CARD: VISA PLUS
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 16.88%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 16.88%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $25
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 16.88%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: 2%
FEE FLOOR: $5
FEE CEILING: $50
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 16.88%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 16.88%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
29 TYPE: CHICAGO REGION CU INSTITUTION: CHICAGO PATROLMEN'S FCU
NAME OF CARD: VISA CLASSIC
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $25
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $25
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 11.90%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 11.90%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
30 TYPE: CHICAGO REGION CU INSTITUTION: ILLIANA FINANCIAL CU
NAME OF CARD: MASTERCARD REGULAR
PURCHASE APR CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 12.84%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 12.84%
APR TYPE: FIXED
OTHER APR CRITERIA
INTRODUCTORY APR: n/a
NO. OF CYCLES INTRO. APR APPLIES: n/a
DEFAULT RATE: n/a
DEFAULT RATE TYPE: n/a
FEES. TERMS, AND CONDITIONS
ANNUAL FEE: $0
OVER THE LIMIT FEE: $10
LOWEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $10
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LATE FEE: $10
GRACE PERIOD, IN DAYS: 25
CASH ADVANCE CRITERIA
APR: 12.84%
APR TYPE: FIXED
CA FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
BALANCE TRANSFER CRITERIA
LOWEST APR IN RANGE: 12.84%
HIGHEST APR IN RANGE: 12.84%
BT FEE: n/a
FEE FLOOR: n/a
FEE CEILING: n/a
Woodstock Institute
Woodstock Institute, a Chicago nonprofit incorporated in 1973, works locally, nationally and 
internationally to promote sound community reinvestment and economic development in lower-income 
and minority communities. It collaborates with community organizations, financial institutions, 
foundations, government agencies, and others to promote its goals.
The Institute engages in applied research, policy analysis, technical assistance, public education, and 
program design and evaluation. Its areas of expertise include: community reinvestment and fair lending 
policies, financial and insurance services, small business lending, community development financial 
institutions, and economic development strategies.
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